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Unintentional Fallacies 
Gordon Armstrong 
The more conscious brain is far more conventional. It's good for 
getting to the store on time and stuff. But you have to get rid of 
that voice or subdue it on some level. 
Neil Simon 
So at that moment I'm the person sitting there in the chair, thinking, 
"I hear this voice, I know that's somebody that I know . . . ." And 
then once you get it "voiced," . . . the writing can begin. 
Marsha Norman 
I. Intentionality and the creative mind 
In May, 1989, in a paper presented to delegates of the International 
Federation for Theater Research Xlth World Congress in Stockholm, Ronald 
Vince noted that the decade of the nineteen eighties had seen the development 
of theater scholarship into a discipline that emulates the standards established 
in other fields of scientific knowledge.1 However, James Arnott's 1981 call, in 
New Theater Quarterly, for the establishment of "a discipline to serve the artist" 
has not been achieved.2 In Vince's opinion, "We have developed a descriptive 
vocabulary—that of semiotics for instance—but we do not have a convincing 
aesthetic vocabulary, and the question of artistic judgment remains 
unanswered."3 
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8. Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
Theater theory and historiography have evolved in the past decade out of 
a critique of positivist methodology, in particular out of Bruce McConachie's 
critique of Oscar Brockett's methodological approach to theater history, based 
on objective evaluation, authentication, and interpretation of documentary 
evidence.4,5 According to Vince, the "documentary imperative" of positivism, 
derived from nineteenth century German Scholarship that stressed an emphasis 
on primary documentary evidence, insisted that the historian's task was similar 
to that of the cultural archeologist.6 This interesting parallel is even more 
germane when one considers the changes historians have made in their 
conception of archeological methodology in the past two decades. In 1972, 
Foucault had noted that historically the document was "treated as the language 
of a voice since reduced to silence."7 Historians of the past viewed documents 
as inert objects that could miraculously be reconstituted to reveal what men 
had said or done. Now, stated Foucault, historians must not interpret a 
document but become cultural archaeologists and work on "the interplay of 
relations within it and outside it."8 This was an archeology of social strata that 
consisted of intrinsic descriptions of documentary materials as relations of 
unities, series, and tables. The goal now was to define series' limits, relations, 
strata, etc., over large periods of time and to individualize different strata; to 
juxtapose documents from widely spaced periods without reducing them to 
linear schema.9 
McConachie concurred in his critique of positivist historians, who, he 
suggested, are prone to hold "that facts retain significance in themselves." 
Noting also the positivists' belief that facts, arranged into patterns of 
relationships, unlock wider historical meanings //—an important caveat for the 
positivist—the barnacles of subjective meanings are carefully scraped away. 
McConachie firmly admonishes these researchers: "From the phenomenologist-
postpositivist point of view . . . the barnacles themselves contain the only 
significance that can be known."10 Time analyses of shifting spatial relations, 
and of documentary interpretations—in all their ambiguity and 
discontinuity—are more important than analysis of a document itself, in all its 
presumed objectivity and singularity. 
In 1970, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn 
described the discontinuous advancement of knowledge by the sequential 
development of what he termed a revolutionary paradigm shift.11 This shift 
occurs when a prevailing system of thought can no longer explain the 
anomalies of a theory. Ptolemaic astronomy, for example, was replaced in 
1543 by Copernicus's revolutionary paradigm on the placement of the sun in 
the cosmos. In 1985, two theater paradigms were proposed. Joseph Roach's 
The Player's Passion examined the science of acting, and suggested that 
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Stanislavski's teachings and the proponents of American method acting, had 
deflected research away from competing theories, in particular Diderot's 
Paradoxe sur le comédien (1773). Subsequent acting theories and commentary, 
in many ways derivative of Stanislavski, have not clarified an already 
mysterious process. As Roach noted: 
These terms and concepts do not add up to anything approaching 
complete answers to the problems posed by the actor's art, then or 
now. That we still regard the creative process and the performance 
event as miracles of a sort is credit to their fugitive nature and to 
the fascination that their contradictions continue to exert upon us.12 
Roach examined actor's passions scientifically, biologically, experientially, over 
the course of Western civilization, using Diderot's Paradoxe as a new 
paradigm. He concluded that since the eighteenth century, physiology and 
psychology have sought to demystify the actor's "act of revelation." In 
consequence, the act of revelation that elevates the true actor's feelings into 
a kind of fiction—a work of art if done well—is further from being understood 
today, in the age of Stanislavski and the proponents of his scientific approach 
to acting, than it was in Diderot's.13 
Also in a 1985 article, Bruce McConachie's call for a new postpositivist 
theater history paradigm attacked current practitioners of a nineteenth century 
positivist historiography, who based their research on August Comte's precept 
that material facts are the building blocks of objective truth.14 In proposing 
that all objective facts were value judgments, McConachie's phenomenological 
and structural paradigm suggested that the theater historian begin with a 
question or two—questions based on his or her own values before looking for 
"pertinent" information: 
From a postpositivist perspective, question-asking (even educated 
guessing) begins historical investigation; it does not follow the 
gathering of facts. And since this initial step is necessarily value-
laden, better for the historian to examine his values through the lens 
of an appropriate theory, a process which can in turn, help him or 
her to ask more pointed questions.15 
In McConachie's view, postpositivism needed a social-cultural frame of 
reference, since all interpretations are subjective, primarily language-based, and 
therefore prejudicial distortions of the truth. Agreeing with Attilio Favorini's 
relocation of the theatrical event "to some mid-point of inter-subjectivity 
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between performer and audience," McConachie suggested "the theatrical-
dramatic situation exists in the dialectical interchange between concrete visual 
and aural images created by actors and others and the minds of the 
audience."16 
Some qualification of these assertions may be in order. In the first place, 
McConachie left out any somesthetic stimulus. Furthermore, in describing his 
"dialectical interchange" as the basis of the theatrical-dramatic situation, 
McConachie raised as many questions as he attempted to answer. In what way 
are visual and aural images "concrete"? Are these actor's images "created," 
experienced, or a combination thereof? Are there additional "image" factors 
to be considered? What is meant by the "minds" of the audience? Are they 
also concrete? Finally, what is an "interchange" between an actor's image and 
a spectator's mind, and how is it effected? 
McConachie's short but exemplary discussion of Bert State's' structural 
analysis of actor-audience relationships and Bruce Wilshire's phenomenological 
description of theater as "a worldly mode of communal interpretation" affirmed 
in significant ways that the audience was co-creator of theatrical events, in 
particular postmodernist theatrical performances of the kind created by Robert 
Wilson and Andre Serban.1718 The impossibility of such an analysis taking 
place within positivist guidelines, particularly such guidelines as posited by 
Oscar Brockett, precisely defined the most serious anomaly to any positivist 
paradigm for historical investigation. What is needed now is more precise 
description of those events; more analyses of limits, divisions, strata; perhaps 
a redirection of the origins of intention to "read" the barnacles that comprise 
any series attendant to those relations. 
Notice should also be made that a Burkean terminology—McConachie's 
proposed solution—still depended on a concept of spectator's "reality": 
Working back and forth between similar shows on the stage and 
what the historian may logically deduce to have been the probable 
expectations of the production's main audience, the theater historian 
may come to a rough approximation of the likely chart, dream, and 
prayer of the ritual for its historical spectators.19 
On an encouraging note, McConachie's directive to theater historians that they 
must rethink and reconstitute the norms of their discipline accorded with 
Foucault's archeological metaphor, and with Marvin Carlson's recognition of 
the plurality of voices and strategies of interpretation at work among theater 
theorists and practitioners.20 The poison of regarding objective criticism and 
historiography as attainable has been recognized. But we are still faced with 
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the antidotes of value judgments, prejudices, and subjective interpretations in 
Kenneth Burke's structures of social relations. Little in the nature of 
comprehending the art of the theater has been gained. 
The postpositivists rejected nineteenth century positivism in general 
because of its dictum that facts contain significance in themselves, and their 
arrangement into larger patterns of relationships can unlock wider historical 
meanings.21 However, these critiques, which postulated a new paradigm of 
revised relationships between documents and researchers, were not the only 
challenges the positivists faced.22 The pure form of positivism insisted that a 
literary work be examined in relation to factual causes or genesis: "The 
author's life, his recorded intentions in writing, his immediate social and 
cultural environment, his sources."23 
In questioning the subjective concept of "intention," the New Critics had 
their innings with the positivists; some attacks were quite justified, some 
attacks have not been refuted to this day. However, in applying this standard 
to drama, to the creation of dramatic scripts, and to the performance of 
dramatic works in the theater in particular in the second half of this article, the 
validity of the arguments of the New Critics and the positivists vanish. As 
discussed by certain contemporary playwrights, "intentionality" was neither 
subjective nor objective, conscious nor unconscious, but "less conscious," a 
biological necessity of what has been described by Paul MacLean as man's 
triune brain.24 Recent research in neurology suggests that the ideology of 
literary and dramatic criticism and of the human sciences, anchored in 
nineteenth century paradigms, may be on extremely shaky ground. 
The first crack in the positivist-cum-postpositivist edifice came in 1986, 
when British anthropologist Victor Turner, revered mentor to Richard 
Scheduler's "Performance Theories," renounced hallowed axioms of his own, 
of his generation, and of several subsequent generations; axioms that expressed 
the belief "that all human behavior is the result of social conditioning."25 
Taking a page from both Foucault and MacLean, Turner discussed the geology 
of the human brain, noting that each strata is alive, and that "even our reptilian 
and paleomammalian brains are human, linked in infinitely complex ways to 
the conditionable upper [neomammalian] brain and kindling it with their 
powers."26 This research did not precede postpositivism. Bypassing New 
Criticism, the postpositivists skipped over an important area of inter-
disciplinary dialogue; ignoring recent neurological and anthropological 
research, postpositivists further endangered an already tenuous foundation. 
Much has been written about New Critical practise. The New Criticism 
was derived from the writings of I. A. Richards and T. S. Eliot, and was 
developed in America by John Crowe Ransom, Cleanth Brooks, Allan Tate, 
12 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley in the 1940s and 1950s to challenge 
positivistic assumptions that a literary text expresses its place and time, or the 
author's personality and nothing more. In the view of the New Critics, "The 
poem [and I take this to include a dramatic poem or piece of theater] is not 
the critic's own and not the author's . . . . The poem belongs to the public. 
It is embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is 
about the human being, an object of public knowledge."27 Further, the New 
Critics declared: "The design or intention of the author is neither available nor 
desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art."28 As 
Robey noted in his discussion of this issue of authorial relevance, the only 
things that matter to the New Critic are the grasp of the full historical meaning 
of the language use in the text (including all its associations), and the names 
to which references may be made, but only to the extent that the meanings of 
these associations and references are a matter of public record about the 
culture in which the text was produced.29 For those who work in the theater, 
the suggestion that the poem is embodied in language completely discounts the 
transformative qualities of performance. The figure is certainly arguable, but 
possibly not more than thirty percent of the meaning of a play is language-
ridden. (I except the plays and dramatic theory of W. B. Yeats and Gordon 
Craig.) Even the assertion, in the name of scientific objectivity, that the 
specific properties of a text consist in the objective organization of the public, 
objective, meanings of words, is arguable. Statements that the studies of the 
authors' lives, of their immediate environment, of their ideas about writing and 
of the genesis of their works are to be excluded, denies the very basis of a 
comprehensive artistic analysis of a play's deep structures. 
If the New Criticism is applied to theatrical production, the notion of 
avoiding the "Intentional Fallacy" in drama, whereby theater directors 
deliberately skirt any attempt to portray accurately what a given playwright had 
in mind at the moment of inspiration—Molière writing for himself, La Grange, 
Madeleine and Armande Béjart; Shakespeare writing for Heminges, Condell, 
Pope, Phillips, Kemp, Richard Burbage, et al.—begs the question of what 
exactly the contemporary director can have in mind when she or he 
subjectively evaluates and interprets the objective structure of a play's 
meaning? The New Critics attempted to abolish personal history but they did 
not abolish a new intentional subjectivity. Richard Scheduler's Performance 
Theory is a case in point.30 As McConachie noted, in Performance Theory, 
Scheduler's thesis was developed from the anthropological theories of Victor 
Turner.31 Schechner claimed the paradigm of the rite of passage to be the 
heart of all ritual. But there is also a New Critics' mentality within 
Scheduler's theory. In Performance Theory, Schechner discussed the 
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Natyasastra, a compilation of stage experiences in classical Indian dance-
theater. In company with McConachie's siting of the dramatic representation 
at a mid-point between the stage and each spectator, or Bruce Wilshire's 
mimetic fusion that occurs between actors and audiences, Schechner found 
links in his interpretation of the Natyasastra "between 'mechanical acting' and 
feelings: the causal chain can go in both directions."32 Having declared that the 
"performance—the psychophysical score of a scene, dance, piece of music, 
etc.—occupies a space between the performer who is doing the action and the 
spectator who is receiving it," Schechner suggested that the performer 
performing can be the "objective correlative" of T. S. Eliot's "enunciable 
literary text."33 But Eliot's "objective correlative" is a descriptive term, "not a 
turning loose of emotion but an escape from emotion," an indirect expression 
of feelings through the description of things.34 Scheduler's use of specific 
theoretical concerns, voiced by one of the founders of American New 
Criticism, was exactly the right track for him to follow in devising both a 
description and an analysis of performance. But the critical elements for 
evaluation, the persuasive analysis of the actor's creative process in achieving 
the representation of a specific character, and how that process is 
communicated to the spectator, were missing. 
In their Sewanee Review article, Wimsatt and Beardsley quoted Socrates' 
questioning of a number of poets and other guests on the virtues of the 
assembled poets' works: "There is hardly a person present who would not have 
talked better about their poetry than they [the poets] did themselves. Then I 
knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and 
inspiration."35 Not only should the author or playwright not be consulted 
because his or her commentary is irrelevant but also because the artist has no 
special virtue in comprehending and/or interpreting the true nature of the art 
work. In one respect, the New Critics had a portion of the argument right 
against any interpretation of a playwright's intentions. In "Genesis, A Fallacy 
Revisited," Wimsatt noted that true "intention" lay in those inner workings of 
the mind: "An art work is something which emerges from the private, 
individual, dynamic, and intentionalistic realm of its maker's mind and 
personality."36 And Wimsatt made the critical distinction: 
"The closest one could ever get to the artist's intending or meaning 
mind, outside his work, would be still short of his effective intention 
or operative mind, as it appears in the work itself."37 
According to Robey, the only way to treat a work of art was to examine it as 
an object in the public domain, and not as the private creation of an 
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individual.38 But one should note that, even in the public domain, when an art 
work was interpreted and evaluated, it was not an objective intellectual 
operation. The New Critics had their limitations, but their humanistic 
approach to literary matters was not one of them. The postpositivists, who 
combined a structural application of texts to a phenomenological process by 
which the spectators of a theatrical production could create meaning in a text, 
could not obviate the necessity of including analyses of the art work itself in 
their criticism. 
In his article, "Objective Interpretation," E. D. Hirsch mounted a strong 
counter-attack on the new criticism by noting August Boeckh's 1886 distinction 
between "interpretation," the meaning of a text and "criticism," the relevance 
of a text.39 The latter philological function established a relationship of the 
text to something else. Since the relevance changed constantly, textual 
meaning itself must not be identified with the author's or reader's psychic 
acts.40 In his 1982 Paul Anthony Brick Lectures at the University of Missouri, 
Cleanth Brooks suggested even more remarkably that the intentional fallacy 
referred "not to [sic] mistake made by the author but to one made by the 
reader or the critic."41 To his great credit, Cleanth Brooks brought 
structuralists and deconstructionists into clear focus, noting that "whereas 
structuralism attempts to reveal the deep structure that underlies the surface 
meanings of any literary construct, deconstruction, using a more radical 
analysis, deconstructs that very structure, revealing its lack of any relation to 
anything beyond itself."42 One could scarcely wish for a better rationale for a 
discontinuity theory of history, on the order of the paradigms suggested by 
Foucault or McConachie. 
In the 1980s, the position of postpositivists and phenomenalists who called 
for a relocatipn of the theatrical event at "some mid-point . . . of 
intersubjectivity between performer and audience" (Favorini), or who defined 
theater as a fundamental mode of relationships that intervened between live 
actors and audiences (States), or who described "mimetic fusion" between actor 
and spectator (Wilshire), accentuated Foucault's 1972 emphasis on the play of 
difference. This relocation was not original to Foucault. In 1934, Jan 
Mukarovsky declared "the autonomous existence and essential dynamism of 
artistic structure."43 The work of art—in our case, the theatrical event—"is 
identified neither with the individual state of consciousness of its creator nor 
with any such states in its perceiver nor with the work as artifact," but bears 
the character of a sign. Declaring the art work to be an aesthetic object 
located in the collective unconscious, with the artifact functioning as a 
perceivable signifier, Mukarovsky rejected his contemporaries' view that the art 
work was "a direct reflection of the psychological or even physiological states 
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of its creator or direct reflection of the distinct reality conveyed by the 
work . . , .,l44 By denying the validity of any subjective mental state and any 
hedonistic theory of aesthetics, Mukarovsky and adherents to the Prague 
School neutralized the creative process in favor of the creation of a constant 
dialectical relationship with an outward signifier and a collective unconscious. 
Directly related to this issue, neuroscience of the 1930s was emphatically not 
the neuroscience of the 1980s and 1990s. But the Prague Linguistic Circle 
began with a prior scientific agenda that had more to do with Jungian 
archetypes than dramatic art in this case; art in general for humanity's 
information. Furthermore, as one commentator has noted, this semiotic point 
of view valorized the terms "art" and "aesthetic," giving them a hallowed, 
metaphysical status that rendered them useless except as icons.45 
Relationships of groups of similar elements—sets of apples to sets of 
oranges—rather then direct comparisons, described the methodological 
approach of the cultural archeologist, the postpositivist, and the 
phenomenologist in the theater. Even Richard Schechner, summarily 
announcing the imminent demise of dramaturgy and of conventional theater 
as the detritus of a eurocentric culture—at the very least, an English 
ethnocentric bias we ought to be reaching beyond—suggested that ritual 
performance occupied a space "between the performer who is doing the action 
and the spectator who is receiving it."46 The basis of the New Critics' analytical 
dichotomy—does the text mean what the author wants it to mean or does the 
text mean what the speech community at large takes it to mean?—had been 
consigned to the literary dustheap as naively irrelevant. Radical subjectivity, 
the basis of Modernism, derived principally from the works of Anton Chekhov, 
had no counterpart in the critical world. 
As noted earlier, Hirsch was acutely aware of the subjectivity and 
relativism of contemporary New Critic commentators who, he claimed, 
"destroyed] any basis both for any agreement among readers and for any 
objective study whatever."47 However, Hirsch's critique of Wimsatt and 
Beardsley's "Intentional Fallacy" essay was itself the best reason to abandon 
positivism. Hirsch made a point of singling out Rene Wellek and Austin 
Warren's doctrine that the textual meaning of a document, leading a life of its 
own, changes over the course of time.48 The question Hirsch posed, "Is it 
proper to make meaning dependent upon the reader's own cultural givens?" 
has been soundly answered in the affirmative. Further, Hirsch's apocalyptic 
protest against the concepts of the New Critics: "As soon as the reader's 
outlook is permitted to determine what the text means, we have not simply a 
changing meaning but quite possibly as many meanings as readers," was exactly 
the point of Wellek and Warren's "perspectivism." As Wellek remarked, 
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perspectivism, holding that values "grow out of the historical process of 
valuation," required that the historian "refer a work of art to the values of its 
own time and of all the periods subsequent to its own."49 The resulting 
tensions of ambiguity, as Wellek and Warren described them, and the 
postpositivists' belief in the multiplicity of paradigmatic readings of relations 
to a text, are part and parcel of a realization that objectivity is largely an 
illusion. 
This rejection was perfectly in keeping with Hirsch's own doctrine of 
objectivity. In a real sense, we have simply broadened the "horizons" (Hirsch's 
term) of norms and limits that bound the archeology of meanings represented 
by the text, or script. In his essay, Hirsch's conclusion—that interpretation "is 
the construction of another's meaning"—does not vitiate the intentional fallacy 
arguments since another's meaning might well be, in the context developed 
here, the playwright's, the actor's, the spectator's biological (conscious and 
unconscious) intentions. The old paradigms of "consciousness" and "the 
unconscious," so popularized by psychoanalytic literary theory, simply do not 
stand up to recent neurobiological research. 
There is not space here to elaborate on the neurophysical dynamics of 
"perspectivism," beyond indicating, as I have in the foregoing, the biological 
constructs of Geschwind and Edelman and their implications for further 
research in aesthetic theory. But it is germane to examine certain artist's 
intuitive sense of this neural perspectivism; in particular, a discussion of 
commentary by those playwrights who are on record as acknowledging a "less 
conscious" process in the art of creating sub-intentionally (in the normal sense 
of the word) their works for the theater. 
II. Intentionality and the Playwright's Art 
Playwrights in recent years have become very vocal about the notion of 
artistic creation. David Rabe, Neil Simon, Robert Wilson and David Mamet, 
among others, have all commented in one way or another on the "less 
conscious" aspects of their artistic processes. Their direct witness to the 
process of writing playscripts that produce intentional thought and emotion in 
many ways confirmed the recent research on the relationships of artistic 
creation and spectator comprehension to neural pathways and secondary 
association areas of the human brain, and in particular, to the necessity of the 
interconnectedness of levels of the human brain. Some perspectives on 
unintentional and intentional fallacies in the mimetic arts may be gained from 
what follows: a brief, summary overview of one playwright's text, and his 
perception of his prospective spectator's comprehension of that text; a 
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discussion by two playwrights of the notion of the unconscious in their writing; 
a fourth playwright's description of his conscious efforts to unlock less 
conscious processes; one critic's conversation with a female playwright on the 
creation of "voices" for the stage; and commentary on a sixth contemporary 
American playwright's unconscious presumed needs. Intention, it seems, is 
both conscious and less conscious. Increasingly, the entire spectrum of radical 
subjectivity^-the new perspectivism—appears to be a very complex, 
undismissable mosaic of levels of process. 
The influence of this perspectivism, to be found in the text and 
commentary of several playwrights under discussion below, perhaps justified 
the criteria of the intentional fallacy in the following playwright! In Speed-the-
Plow, David Mamet's 1988 Broadway block-buster, two Hollywood 
hustlers—Bobby Gould, new head of production and Doug Brown, an 
independent producer—manacle morality (and the English language) in the 
name of the god of mo\ies—money to be made on a prospective script: 
Gould: The question, your crass question: how much money could 
we stand to make . . . ? 
Fox: Yes. 
Gould: I think the operative concept here is "lots and lots . . . " 
Fox: Oh maan . . . 
Gould: But money . . . 
Fox: Yeah . . . 
Gould: Money, Charl . . . 
Fox: Yeah . . . 
Gould: Money is not the important thing. 
Fox: No. 
Gould: Money is not Gold. 
Fox: No. 
Gould: What can you do with Money? 
Fox: Nothing. 
Gould: Nary a goddam thing. 
Fox: . . . I'm gonna be rich; 
Gould: "Buy" things with it. 
Fox: Where would I keep them? 
Gould: What would you do with them? 
Fox: Yeah. 
Gould: Take them out and dust them, time to time. 
Fox: Oh, yeah. 
Gould: I piss on money. 
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Fox: I know that you do. I'll help you. 
Gould: Fuck money! 
Fox: Fuck it. Fuck "things" too . . . 
Gould: Uhhuh. But don't fuck "people." 
Fox: No. 
Gould: 'Cause people, Charlie . . . 
Fox: People . . . yes. 
Gould: Are what it's All About. 
Fox: I know. 
Gould: And it's a People Business. 
Fox: That it is. 
Gould: It's full of fucken' people . . . 
Fox: And we're gonna kick some ass, Bob. 
Gould: That we are. 
Fox: We're gonna kick the ass of a lot of them fucken' people. 
Gould: That's right.50 
In a 1988 interview, Mamet substantially explained the cynical, quick-sand 
morality of Gould and Fox: 
We live in very selfish times. Any impulse of creation or whimsy or 
iconoclasm which achieves general notice is immediately co-opted 
by risk capital, and its popularity—which arose from its generosity 
and freedom of thought—is made to serve the turn of financial 
extortion.51 
But elsewhere, Mamet has also said: 
We, as a culture, as a civilization, are at the point where the 
appropriate, the life-giving, task of the organism is to decay. 
Nothing will stop it, nothing can stop it, for it is the force of life, 
and the evidence is all around us.52 
The one statement seems to contradict the other. If Mamet had the first 
statement in mind when he wrote Speed-the-plow, a director might well 
interpret the play as a statement of the corruptness and phoniness of the 
American entrepreneurial spirit in Hollywood, the "get-rich-quick-at-all-costs" 
syndrome that seemed to pervade the 1980s. But if the director focused on 
Mamet's second statement, where the life-forces of our culture seemed to be 
moving towards an inevitable build-up of maximum entropy, in which nothing 
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would halt the pre-determined demise of our civilization, then Speed-the-Plow 
mocked the very notion of creativity. Perhaps Mamet himself was not clear. 
In any case, Mamet's commentaries could have led to the production of two 
different plays. If Mamet's contradictory postscripts are to be believed, the 
"intentions" of the playwright at the moment of composition are, at best, 
tenuous twine to follow through the labyrinth of consciousness. In Mamet's 
case, over a period of time the intentional fallacy dicta would seem to be 
justified! But even focusing on the play as an ambiguous object trouvé is not 
sufficient. As one noted director has commented, "some playwrights' un-
intentional fallacies are enough to make one gag."53 
In their New York Times' discussion of the role of the unconscious in 
creating a playscript, Neil Simon and David Rabe stated unequivocally that the 
role of conscious intention in the creative process is extremely limited: 
Rabe: I think my conscious mind is not as intelligent as my 
unconscious. My conscious mind is very much interested in 
controlling everything and making it orderly—making it orderly in a 
familiar way. Then the unconscious can come up with something 
original. 
Simon: I know. I know when my unconscious is doing the writing, 
because when my conscious is doing it, it seems familiar to me when 
I see it later on . . . . Brighton Beach Memoirs took nine years from 
the inception of the idea. I let it sit for six years. It just kept going 
in my mind. I would think about it, and six years later I wrote 35 
pages. I said, "This is good, but I don't know how to write the 
play." . . . . And it took another three years. And then I sat down 
and went right through the play. But the unconscious is doing the 
work. It's typing away. 
Rabe: Streamers took a total of seven years from the beginning. 
Suddenly I sat down and in about three or four days rewrote the 
whole play. And it was a full-length play now. I don't know how I 
knew—there's no way to measure that. 
Simon: I feel very happy when I've got an idea for something that 
I think is worth doing. And then I can leave it alone and not work 
at all—it can must do its own work there while I go to the beach or 
play some tenais.54 
If Neil Simon and David Rabe are to be believed, the real creative force in 
playwriting is intentional but not voluntary. Intention is biological as well as 
interpretational. In the act of creation, an intention, or a series of intentions, 
20 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
must be present. It bears repeating: creative processes are not automatic, 
beginning from square one for each function, but resemble in remarkable ways 
the dynamic of the Foucault analogy of relational and associational geological 
strata. Furthermore, the brain of man is not a computer resembling any of the 
current generations. On a more technical level, these elaborate non-limbic 
secondary association areas, which lead to associational maps of neural 
populations, are—through the differential amplification of reentry stimuli over 
a period of time, the basis of human thought as we know it. Parallel 
processing, the next generations of computers perhaps, is as close as science 
has yet come to the essential dynamic of imitating human brain function. 
Playwrights whose work deliberately explored the mechanisms and 
possibilities of the bicameral mind posed considerable difficulties for both 
directors and actors. As playwright and director, Robert Wilson, for example, 
methodically created a visual core on which an audible text was superimposed. 
Wilson's method was conscious while his creation was less conscious. The 
playwright has described his creative process as the equivalent of combining 
the visual portion of a silent screen film with the audio portion of a radio 
play.55 Instead of courting "the unconscious," as Simon and Rabe suggest, 
Wilson deliberately stalked the unconscious in a profusion of visual images, to 
which he later appended a text about a central idea. In describing the 
composition of the CIVIL warS, Wilson consciously mapped his deliberate 
chronology: 
Wilson: First I made a structure out of what was earlier 
arbitrary—some 5 cuts . . . . Then without knowing the text or visual 
effects, I worked from this diagram. Then I drew diagrams and 
covered the walls of my empty apartment in NYC with paper and 
began to make drawings and sketches as set builders would look and 
collected a series of drawings that filled out the structure. I found 
out through this the single theme that would thread through [the 
cuts], until the optical chapters were integrated like a tapestry. . . . 
And then separate (sic) from that, I wrote a text without thinking of 
a definite context.56 
Wilson was deliberately conscious in his effort to create subliminal 
audible and optical text. In the foreword to the catalog for The Forest, he 
elaborated on the problem Newtonian "container-space" poses for 
contemporary dramatists: 
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If we don't illustrate in the visual book the visual imagery of the 
text, then the visual book of the audio screen is boundless. And if 
we don't illustrate the visual book with the audio book, then the 
visual screen is boundless. The problem with most theatre is that 
it gets boxed in . . . we're always shifting in and out of these 
interior/exterior audio-visual screens.57 
Wilson's efforts to free the audio-visual screens were made to give the 
spectators a creative voice in the interpretation of the stage performance. In 
displacing the playwright's traditional role of providing a definitive script, 
Wilson forced the viewer to choose a text. By freeing the spectator's reentry 
creative choices, by making the conscious mappings (and unconscious neural 
mappings) a personal (and biological) choice of the spectator watching and 
listening to the stage performance, the playwright provided the audience 
member with the opportunity to have as authentic an experience of the 
production as the artist onstage. 
In American Voices, a recent critical assessment of five American 
playwrights, Esther Harriott suggested that Sam Shepard is himself "a 
narcissistic individual . . . [who yearns] to return to a symbiotic union with a 
dominant parent.58 Such a statement, made in response to her analysis of 
Shepard's dramatic works, raises critical alarms. Modern psychoanalytic 
criticism has shifted its emphases away from the psychology of the playwright 
to relations between playwright, spectator, text, and language.59 Inevitably the 
playwright, when asked, says that he or she "had a spectator in mind," or "saw 
the play in terms of a spectator looking at the stage." Positivism has died a 
slow death in American theater, whether in the form of Harriott's style of 
critical analysis; in the guise of the "benevolent despot" school of directors; in 
the dictums of acting commentaries that solely insist on achieving "emotional 
truth;" and/or in classroom discussions of "schools" of criticism.60 Radical 
subjectivity begins by asking: "what is the meaning of 'benevolent?' of 
'achievement?' of 'truth?' of 'Be-ing?' beyond 'the reality of the doing' in the 
life of the theater? The cognition of the complex mosaic of neural processes 
is the beginning of artistic judgment. 
A less conscious approach to the problem of creativity appeared in Esther 
Harriott's interview with Marsha Norman: 
Harriott: How do you give [your characters] that voice? How do you 
get inside their consciousness . . . ? 
Norman: It's a voicing process . . . . I'm sure it's like composers 
when they begin to hear melodies . . . . 
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Harriott: You're saying that you hear it literally? 
Norman: Yes, literally I'll begin to hear lines of dialogue. And the 
question gets to be "Who's speaking?" At that point, it's like that 
old TV show, "This Is Your Life"—isn't that the one where they had 
someone speaking behind the scrim? So at that moment I'm the 
person sitting there in the chair, thinking, "I hear this voice, I know 
that's somebody that I know. Who is it? And then once you get it 
"voiced," once you know how the characters talk, the writing can 
begin.61 
Marsha Norman described what might be acknowledged as Gerald Edelman's 
"intentional re-entry," where maps of cross-modal association pathways are 
brought to the primary sensory areas of the brain—neuronal stimuli in search 
of an object—an act clearly on the mind of Pirandello in his 1925 Preface to 
Six Characters in Search of an Author. 
Creatures of my spirit, these six were already living a life which was 
their own and not mine any more, a life which was not in my power 
any more to deny them . . . . They are detached from me; live on 
their own; have acquired voice and movement; have by 
themselves—in this struggle for existence that they have had to wage 
with me—become dramatic characters, characters that can move and 
talk on their own initiative.62 
Cleanth Brooks saw the intentional fallacy as demonstration of the fact—noted 
by Socrates two millennia ago—that writers sometimes write better than they 
know, "that oftentimes more than conscious design is involved, and that the 
writer does not always tell . . . the whole truth . . . about what his specific 
intentions were."63 But he did not seem to recognize the possibility that 
playwrights like Robert Wilson, Luigi Pirandello, and Samuel Beckett may 
deliberately court a more—or less than—conscious design. 
Samuel Beckett, a playwright who acknowledged privately that his plays 
were a "less conscious" creation, was particularly sensitive to the precision of 
concrete details that anchor his creations.64 In the CIVIL warS, Robert Wilson 
insisted that a particular piece of stage property be spiked within an eighth of 
an inch; actors in a Wilson play moved "by-the-numbers" in measured robotic 
precision.65 A recent Beckett production at Cambridge's American Repertory 
Theatre showed how insistent a playwright could be about the appearance of 
his work. JoAnne Akilaitus' December 1984 production of Endgame elicited 
Beckett's fierce resistance to the play's gutted Metropolitan Transit Authority 
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underground setting. Commenting in Paris in September, 1985, Beckett 
remarked: "Clov looks out a window; he sees nothing. How can this setting 
represent that!"66 Describing the production as "an Endcircus," Beckett refused 
to acknowledge the production as his work. The relationship of setting to text, 
in which meaning, related to a particular space, creeps through the interstices 
of the language, reflected Beckett's absolute sense of the playwright's 
intentional relationships of space to language. 
This tragic creative act, singular, human, reflective, is one measure of the 
achievement of man, and marks him as separate and distinct among the 
species. Aristotle's definition of tragedy^-"an imitation of an action . . . 
exciting pity and fear, and bringing about the catharsis of such emotions"— fell 
short of a description of Twentieth Century theater.67 Communication in the 
theatre comes not from objective mimesis, "imitation of an action," but from 
this radical subjectivity, the discontinuous, implicative neural mapping in the 
triune brain of the spectator. The focus is on the action, as it triggers 
archeological deposits of social and cultural strata. But recognition, and 
parallel identification, is also felt along the rows, laterally. As one astute 
scholar of the theater wrote: "the thrill is feeling yourself what the audience is 
feeling, sharing the expectations and the satisfactions that the action 
provides."68 This double, even triple, perspective locks the attentive spectator 
into the theatrical realm, where an image of the present unleashes neural 
images of the past, whose present stage action precurses and predicts 
(foreordains?) the future, climactic stage moments, and images of future past 
neural moments. Samuel Beckett deliberately courted this perspective as the 
"vaguened image."69 At this present moment, the paradigmatic power of 
theater and religion can merge, with the actor onstage serving as a medium, 
among other discontinuous mediums, of the playwright's own creative neural 
mappings of discontinuous associations. 
The act of "crossing the threshold of the stage," as Stanislavsky described 
it, of making a "bungie cord" leap off a conscious mental bridge into the 
unknown world of a hundred—perhaps a thousand—billion synapses in the 
geology of the triune brain of man with no certainty of a safe return, is the 
actor's art. The bungie cord analogy represents one line among many possible 
lines of discontinuous mappings, and hierarchies of mappings that an actor 
might take in assaying a role. There is a complexity of less conscious 
intentions in role playing that the positivists, the New Critics, and even the 
postpositivists might never have imagined. Theater was the first mimetic art 
to celebrate these discontinuous possibilities. The interpretation of the bungie 
cord analogy, the absolute necessity of the interplay of unintentional relations 
within and outside the actor's, the designer's, the stage technician's art, by the 
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playwright and the spectator respectively, might be a beginning point that 
really serves the creative artist.70 
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